Abstract. This paper describes that the stability for vehicle to vehicle (V2V) communication in Internet of Vehicles (IoV). The V2V communication is important factors for intelligent transportation system that is fast becoming commercialization. In this paper, we particularly focus on the vulnerabilities of the authentication form used as an essential factor in communication between vehicles. We propose the secure vehicle certificate method against the threat posed by CA access by improving the authentication issue process of CA that has been a week point.
Introduction
Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) in Internet of Vehicles (IoV) allows for direct communication between vehicles traveling at high speed, thus providing safety as part of the services. The existing ITS services provide static services when a car moves through a certain spot or section. It was focused on after-incident management with constraints on prompt response in case of traffic accidents. But the C-ITS currently in pilot in Korea offers dynamic services where the road infrastructure and vehicles constantly communicate with one another. This allows for prompt prevention and response. The WAVE system technologically supports the communication amongst the infrastructure, the vehicles or the user device, thus delivering the current status of the roads to moving vehicles so that they can receive real-time information. As a result, it is expected to be applicable to various areas such as preventing collisions or accidents causing human lives. With the increase in applied wireless communication technology, security risks are exposed to Man in the Middle (MITM) attacks, resending attacks and other attacks. If the messages of a car collision accident are exposed to a third party and this is disguised or changed, then nearby cars can become victims of even more accidents. To prevent such scenarios, reliable authentication is sought after in the vehicle communication systems. Given the characteristics of cars moving at high speed, mutual authentication using authentication forms is the basis of the system. While the authentication form is easy to access and to replicate, once it is managed poorly or stored online such as in a cloud, there is the risk of being hacked or attacked by a virus. In fact, there are many accidents related to the theft of authentication forms. If such authentication form is stolen from a car moving at high speed, this can lead to a dangerous situation that puts the driver's life at risk. For such reasons, this paper suggests an ensure for a safe issue of authentication forms in the WAVE system.
2
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C2C-CC
The CSR authentication is issued by LTCA (Long Term CA), and the pseudonym authentication by PCA (Pseudonym CA). If a vehicle requests an issue using the CSR authentication to PCA, PCA through LTCA verifies the validity of the CSR authentication form and a pseudonym authentication form. In the CAMP method, even an insider who can access RA cannot discover the ID information that generates the CSR authentication form and pseudonym authentication, while in the C2C-CC (Car2Car-Communication Consortium) method, an insider with access to PCA can find the CSR authentication form and the ID of the pseudonym authentication form. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to conduct authority management and training and to prevent insider information leakage by securing audit evidence [1] [3]. WAVE standard. The structure of the WAVE is as seen in Fig. 1 . The WAVE can be categorized into three parts of WAVE Security Service, Data Plane, and Management Plane. WAVE Security Service provides the services that can complement the omitted authentication of IEEE 802.11p, while the Management Plane requests or advertises services from the RSU (Road-Side Unit) or OBU (OnBoard Unit). Data Plane contains the data flow for actual data transmission and reception [1] [2]. 
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Protocol Design
This chapter reviews the issues with C2C-CC where the PCA issues a pseudonym authentication form at which point a pseudonym for the vehicle ID is generated and issued to the vehicle. During this process, the vehicle ID information can be stored in order to trace the vehicle ID. This poses the risk of anyone with access to PCA or a malicious attacker stealing the vehicle ID. Therefore, by preventing the PCA from knowing the ID that can generate the authentication form using RCA, leakage of information on the vehicle ID can be prevented. 
Conclusion
This paper suggests a method issuing authentication forms that can improve security by reducing the likelihood of hacking in the authentication process required for communication between vehicles in the intelligent transport system. In addition, a quantitative analysis will be conducted on the stability and efficiency of the suggested protocol to conduct an evaluation on the functions. As a follow-up study, the direction of security that can defend against new and evolving attacks in the intelligent transport system environment will be reviewed.
